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Abstract: This  paper  surveys  the  use  of  pandemic-related  provisions  in  Material  Adverse  Effects 
(MAE)  provisions  in  a  large  data  set  of  publicly  disclosed  M&amp;A  transactions  spanning  the 
years  2003-2020.  We  document  a  trend  towards  greater  use  of  such  provisions,  taking  off 
particularly  after  the  H1N1  crisis  in  2009,  and  spiking  again  in  late  2019  and  early  2020.  These 
terms  are  invariably  located  in  the  exclusions  /  carve-outs  to  the  MAE,  and  they  are 
overwhelmingly  accompanied  by  "disproportionate  effects"  language  that  tends  to  dampen  the 
effect  of  the  carve  out.  There  is  little  discernible  statistical  relationship  between  the  inclusion  of  a 
pandemic-related  carve-out  and  the  inclusion  of  a  reverse  termination  fee  ("RTF")  granting 
optionality  to  the  buyer;  but  when  an  RTF  is  present,  its  magnitude  tends  to  be  smaller  in  the 
absence  of  any  pandemic-specific  carve-out,  suggesting  some  degree  of  observational 
complementarity  between  these  terms.  
 
  
1  A  revision  of  this  paper  will  be  published  in  the  Michigan  State  Law  Review.  This  draft  builds  on  a  series  of  blog 
entries  we  originally  posted  on  the  Columbia  Blue  Sky  Blog .  The  original  entries  can  be  found  here  and  here . 
Thanks  to  [your  name  here]  for  comments  and  suggestions.  All  errors  are  ours. 
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A  folk  proverb  from  the  American  West  teaches  that  the  most  important  ingredient  of  a 
successful  rain  dance  is  timing.  And  the  timing  couldn’t  be  worse  for  signed  corporate  deals 
hanging  in  the  balance  at  the  onset  of  the  novel  coronavirus  pandemic.   As  of  March  2020,  we 
estimate  that  there  were  over  300  significant  mergers  and  acquisitions  (M&A)  transactions 
signed  and  waiting  to  close,  representing  over  half  a  trillion  US  dollars  in  economic  value.  The 
fate  of  these  deals  has  been  thrown  into  considerable  doubt  by  the  COVID-19  crisis.  And,  in  an 
uncanny  resemblance  to  the  onset  of  the  financial  crisis  in  fall  2008 ,  corporate  lawyers 
everywhere  are  spending  their  social-distancing  hours  scouring  the  terms  of  these  deals  in  a 
frenzied  search  for  an  escape  hatch  that  might  unwind  the  transaction:  And  indeed,  as  of  April 
2020,  a  growing  list  of  pending  acquisitions  (including  SoftBank  /  WeWork ,  Gray  Television  / 
Tegna ,  Volkswagen  /  Navistar )  appear  headed  for  rough  waters. 
  
In  lawyer -speak,  the  most  likely  candidate  for  an  escape-hatch  is  something  called  a  force 
majeure  (or  “Act  of  God”)  provision,  which  governs  when  changed  circumstances  are  deemed  so 
significant  as  to  obliterate  an  otherwise  enforceable  contract.  In  business  lawyer -speak,  force 
majeures  are  usually  called  “material  adverse  change/material  adverse  effect”  (hereinafter  MAE) 
provisions;  but  they  work  pretty  much  the  same  way,  conditioning  a  party’s  (usually  the  buyer’s) 
duty  to  close  a  deal  on  the  non-occurrence  of  a  specific  set  of  contingencies.  MAEs  are  virtually 
ubiquitous  in  M&A;  and—unlike  many  other  boilerplate  terms—they  are  heavily  negotiated  at 
the  time  of  the  transaction.  This  is  for  good  reason:  when  an  MAE  is  triggered,  billions  of  dollars 
can  hang  in  the  balance. 
  
Some  recent  transactions—such  as  Morgan  Stanley’s  acquisition  of  E*Trade  ( announced  on 
February  20)— explicitly  account  for  COVID-19  through  their  MAE ,  typically  deeming  it  not  to 
constitute  a  force  majeure.  But  most  “legacy”  deals—signed  up  before  the  coronavirus  threat 
exploded — are  far  more  opaque.  Consider,  for  example,  LVMH’s  pending  $16  billion  acquisition 
of  Tiffany  &  Co.,  announced  in  late  2019  and  subsequently  approved  by  Tiffany  shareholders, 
but  still  not  closed.  The  MAE  in  that  deal  is  representative,  featuring  both  affirmative  and 
negative  provisos  that  can  be  thought  of  metaphorically  as  something  akin  to  a  slice  of  Swiss 
cheese : 
  
● The  affirmative  terms  represent  the  cheese,  and  they  lay  out  situations  that  would  allow 
LVMH  to  walk  away.  Included  are  contingencies  that  would  materially  affect  the 
“business,  condition  (financial  or  otherwise),  properties,  assets,  liabilities  (contingent  or 
otherwise),  business  operations  or  results  of  operations  of  Tiffiny  and  its  subsidiaries, 
taken  as  a  whole.”  Also  included  are  contingencies  that  “would  reasonably  be  expected  to 
prevent,  materially  delay  or  materially  impair”  the  closing  of  the  deal. 
  
● The  negative  terms  represent  the  holes  in  the  cheese,  and  they  specify  specific  carve  outs 
or  exceptions  to  the  affirmative  provisions.  Like  many  MAEs,  the  carve  outs  are  far  more 
numerous,  and  they  include 
o    changes  or  conditions  generally  affecting  Tiffany’s  industry 
o    general  economic  or  political  conditions  in  any  country  where  Tiffany  operates 
(including  China); 
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o    changes  in  the  market  price  or  trading  volume  of  the  Tiffany’s  securities  or 
credit  ratings  
o    geopolitical  conditions,  including  the  outbreak  or  escalation  of  hostilities,  acts 
of  war,  sabotage,  terrorism; 
o    natural  disasters,  including  hurricane,  tornado,  flood,  earthquake  or  “other 
natural  disaster”. 
  
Conspicuously  absent  from  either  the  cheese  or  the  holes  in  the  Tiffany  deal  is  any  explicit 
mention  of  a  global  pandemic.  It  seems  likely  that  colorable  arguments  might  be  made  on  both 
sides.  Although  many  of  the  items  enumerated  in  the  affirmative  provisions  may  well  be 
captured  by  the  COVID-19  outbreak,  several  exclusions  could  touch  on  it  as  well.  This  deal  may 
thus  fall  into  a  relatively  difficult  and  far  grayer  (if  not  Gruyère)  zone. 
  
And  that  begs  the  question  of  whether  the  language  of  MAE  provisions  in  the  aggregate  might 
be  used  to  unwind  signed  deals  in  the  face  of  a  pandemic.  To  get  a  handle  on  this  question,  we 
deployed  some  tools  of  machine  learning  and  natural  language  processing,  an  approach  that  has 
already  been  shown  to  be  helpful  in  studying  MAE  provisions  as  well  as  other  business 
contracts . 
  
To  take  on  this  question,  we  updated  a  data  set  that  we  had  previously  collected  and  cleaned, 
consisting  of  announced  transactions  and  meta  information  associated  with  the  deals  (all  drawn 
from  FactSet).  The  combined  volume  of  the  deals  is  around  10  trillion  USD.  The  dataset  covers 
acquisitions  in  two  dozen  distinct  industries  for  deals  spanning  the  years  2003  through  the  end  of 
2020,  thus  providing  a  broad  view  of  over  fifteen  years  of  market  practice  (including, 
importantly,  the  financial  crisis).  In  all,  our  data  set  consists  of  1702  MAE  provisions  over  an 
18-year  time  span  (including  about  80  of  relatively  larger  deals  representing  around  $250 
billion).  2
  
In  analyzing  the  MAEs,  we  first  focused  on  language  that  expressly  captures  a  global  pandemic 
like  COVID-19.  To  ensure  that  we  capture  all  (or  nearly  all)  of  the  language  relevant  to 
COVID-19,  we  assembled  a  list  of  the  terms  most  similar  to  the  words  “disease”  and  “pandemic” 
from  three  data  sources:  (i)  WordNet,  a  large  lexical  database  of  English  maintained  by  language 
experts;  (ii)  GloVe,  a  representation  of  ordinary  English  language;  (iii)  Contracts-word2vec,  a 
language  model  based  on  roughly  half  a  million  agreements  submitted  to  the  SEC  by  publicly 
registered  companies.  We  then  verified  the  results  by  hand.  The  resulting  vocabulary  includes 
terms  specific  to  the  outbreak  of  a  contagious  disease,  such  as  “pandemic,”  “epidemic,”  and 
“public  health.”  But  our  list  also  includes  broader,  more  general  terms  such  as  “act  of  god”  and 
“force  majeure”—gray  area  terms  that  do  not  explicitly  cover  pandemics  but  one  might  imagine 
arguments  going  either  way.  The  complete  list  includes  a  total  of  50  key  terms.  Within  our  data 
set,  15  of  these  terms  appear  with  positive  frequency,  as  reflected  in  the  figure  below.  The  figure 
further  subdivides  between  (i)  general  terms  (pictured  in  red ),  that  arguably  carve  out  a  variety  of 
2  As  referenced  above,  FactSet  lists  over  300  transactions  that  are  pending  as  of  March  2020,  representing  around 
$550  billion  in  value.  There  can  be  considerable  latency  in  the  public  disclosure  of  these  deals,  however  (particularly 
for  companies  not  traded  in  the  US),  which  reduces  the  number  of  pending  deals  with  observable  contractual  terms. 
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force  majeure  events  including  pandemics;  and  (ii)  specific  terms  (pictured  in  blue )  that 
explicitly  invoke  the  term  “pandemic”  or  its  semantic  equivalents. 
 
  
Applying  this  list  to  our  MAE  data,  our  key  finding  is  that—like  the  LVMH/Tiffany  agreement 
discussed  above— less  than  one  out  of  eight  MAE  provisions  in  our  data  set  explicitly  carve  out 
pandemics  from  force  majeure  events .  Indeed,  as  the  left-hand  panel  of  the  figure  below  shows, 
the  majority  of  definitional  carve-outs—a  little  more  than  half— do  not  even  address  a  pandemic 
(or  pandemic-like)  outbreak—either  with  explicit  terms  or  with  “catch-all”  terms  (such  as  “Act 
of  God”,  “Calamity”,  or  “ Force  Majeure ”)  that  arguably  have  sufficient  breadth  and  scope  to  do 
so.  Of  the  remainder  that  arguably  address  COVID19,  the  trigger  usually  comes  through  the 
broad,  catch-all  provisions  (36.2%)  rather  than  through  an  explicit  phrase  related  to  pandemics 
(12%).  That  said,  as  the  right-hand  panel  of  the  figure  illustrates,  pending  deals  appear  to  skew 
much  more  discernibly  towards  carve-outs  (of  both  species):  Nearly  24%  of  pending  deals  carve 
out  pandemic  (or  pandemic-like)  contingencies  explicitly,  and  42%  contain  the  more  general  “act 
of  god”  carve-out  language.  
  
Panel  A.  Full  Data  Set  (2003-Pres.) Panel  B.  Pending  Deals  (as  of  3/26/2020) 
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Digging  a  little  deeper,  it  becomes  evident  that  the  shift  in  carve-outs  is  actually  part  of  a 
longer-term  sea  change  whose  seeds  were  sown  over  a  decade  ago.  The  time  series  charts  below 
track  the  year-by-year  prevalence  of  general  carve-outs  (left  panel),  pandemic-specific  carve-outs 
(center  panel),  and  their  union  (right  panel)  since  2003.  General  force  majeure  carve-outs  became 
significantly  more  prevalent  around  2009  −  coinciding  with  the  emergence  from  the  great 
recession  (well,  at  least  the  last  one ).  But  note  that  pandemic-specific  carve-outs  also  started  to 
go  viral  at  around  the  same  time  (having  been  virtually  non-existent  prior  to  2009).  Although 
global  economic  conditions  had  much  to  do  with  the  rapid  adoption  of  general  force  majeure 
language,  the  pandemic-specific  trend  was  more  likely  a  byproduct  of  the  contemporaneous 
H1N1  crisis  that  unfolded  during  the  spring  of  2009 .  And  this  fraction  continued  to  rise  through 
the  two  waves  of  the  MERS  crisis  (first  in  2012  and  then  again  in  2015) .  By  2019,  fully  23%  of 
deals  specifically  carved  out  pandemics  from  coverage  in  the  MAE . 
   
A.  General  Carve-Outs B.  Pandemic-Explicit  Carve-Outs C.  General  or  Explicit  Carve-Outs 
 
It  is  worth  reiterating  that  when  an  MAE  provision  features  language  bearing  on  a  pandemic  (via 
either  explicit  or  general  terms),  our  data  suggest  that  it  invariably  enters  through  a  carve  out  to 
the  MAE  (the  holes  in  the  cheese)  rather  than  through  an  affirmative  provision  (the  cheese  itself). 
Consequently,  when  present,  such  provisions  would  appear  to  push  pandemic-related  risks  onto 
the  buyer  (and  away  from  the  seller).  A  typical  example  of  an  explicit  pandemic-like  provision  is 
the  private  equity  acquisition  of  the  telecom  company  ComScope  in  2010.  That  provision  reads 
(in  relevant  part): 
  
"Company  Material  Adverse  Effect"  means  a  change,  event  or  occurrence  that  has  a 
material  adverse  effect  on  the  financial  condition,  business  or  results  of  operations  of  the 
Company  and  its  Subsidiaries  taken  as  a  whole;  provided,  however,  that  none  of  the 
following,  and  no  changes,  events  or  occurrences,  individually  or  in  the  aggregate,  to  the 
extent  arising  out  of,  resulting  from  or  attributable  to  any  of  the  following  shall  constitute 
or  be  taken  into  account  in  determining  whether  a  Company  Material  Adverse  Effect  has 
occurred  or  may,  would  or  could  occur: 
… 
(3)  epidemics,  pandemics,  earthquakes,  hurricanes,  tornados  or  other  natural  disasters 
… 
provided,  further,  that,  with  respect  to  [clause  (3)  above,  inter  alia ],  such  changes,  events 
or  occurrences  do  not  materially  and  disproportionately  adversely  affect  the  Company 
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and  its  Subsidiaries,  taken  as  a  whole,  compared  to  other  companies  operating  in  the 
industries  in  which  the  Company  and  its  Subsidiaries  operate.  
  
This  clause  is  a  good  indication  of  the  typical  location  of  an  explicit  provision  (in  the  carved-out 
Swiss-cheese  holes  in  the  MAE).  But  it  also  exposes  the  fact  that  carve-outs  can  come  with  a 
significant  lawyerly  grain  of  salt:  After  expressly  carving  out  contingency  from  the  definition  of 
an  MAE,  the  ComScope  provision  proceeds  to  carve  it  right  back  in  if  the  pandemic  affects  the 
seller  disproportionally ,  relative  to  a  benchmark  of  other  competitors  in  the  industry. 
 
Carve-ins  like  the  one  above  are  far  from  aberrational.  Indeed,  a  significant  fraction  of  MAEs 
that  purportedly  exempt  a  laundry  list  of  enumerated  risks  carve  back  in  aspects  of  those  same 
risks  through  similar  “disproportional  effects”  qualifiers  (whereby  an  excluded  contingency  still 
counts  as  a  force  majeure  if  the  target  suffers  hardships  that  are  disproportionate  to  some  class  of 
peers).  The  figure  below  demonstrates  that  ComScope  deal’s  language  is  far  from  anomalous,  by 
assessing  prevalence  with  which  MAE  terms  that  invoke  a  general  or  specific  carve-out  then 
include  a  “disproportional  effects”  modifier  after  the  carve-out.    Note  that  the  strong  tendency 3
towards  carve-ins  for  disproportional  effects  appears  to  hold  even  when  the  carve-out  uses  more 
general  provisions  (right-hand  panel),  focusing  on  broad  act  of  god  contingencies  (rather  than 
pandemics  in  particular).  Our  preliminary  analysis  suggests,  moreover,  that 
disproportionate-effects  carve-ins  appear  with  roughly  the  same  frequency  (or  perhaps  a  little 
higher)  in  pending  deals.  Thus,  while  carve-outs  have  no  doubt  become  more  prevalent  over 
time,  a  portion  of  their  impact  has  been  blunted  mechanically  by  carve-ins  that  are  typically 
riding  shotgun. 
 
Disproportional  Effects  Carve-In 
3  The  results  reported  on  here  do  not  reflect  a  tedious  hand-verification  that  the  disproportional-effects  language 
modifies  the  pandemic/act-of-god  carve-out  (rather  than  some  other  carve-out),  we  have  performed  this  tedious 
verification  on  a  sub-sample  and  the  results  of  the  two  approaches  are  substantively  identical. 
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(2003-Pres.) 
 
The  upshot  of  this  observation  is  that,  for  most  deals,  the  question  of  whether  COVID-19  triggers 
the  MAE  clause  may  turn  further  on  a  finely-grained  analysis  of  how  the  pandemic  has  affected  a 
company  vis-à-vis  its  peers.  For  targets  that  are  especially  susceptible  to  pandemic  risks  relative 
to  others  in  the  industry,  then,  the  “disproportional  effects”  carve-in  may  shift  risk  right  back  to 
the  seller. 
 
A  second  pressing  question  is  whether  the  more  general  language  carving  out  acts  of  god  and 
force  majeure  events  from  the  MAE  definition  should  be  read  to  apply  to  COVID-19  in  the  first 
place.  In  other  words,  should  one  of  these  general  terms  be  interpreted  as  a  semantic  substitute 
for  an  explicit  term  that  invokes  pandemics?  One  way  to  get  at  that  question  is  to  look  at  the  text 
of  the  MAE  definitions  themselves—and  in  particular  the  frequency  with  which  we  observe 
pandemic-specific  language  enumerated  as  an  example  of  an  act  of  god  or  force  majeure  event 
versus  a  stand-alone  phenomenon.  The  figure  below  displays  the  relative  degree  to  which 
explicit  and  catch-all  language  are  used  as  complements  versus  substitutes.  
 
Overlap  in  General  and  Specific  Terms  (2003-Pres.) 
 
As  the  figure  demonstrates,  when  specific  language  is  invoked,  it  tends  to  be  split  evenly 
between  (a)  being  an  enumerated  example  of  a  general  force  majeure  provision  (57%  of  the 
time);  and  (b)  standing  alone  without  also  invoking  the  more  general  language  (43%  of  the  time). 
Although  this  result  may  be  consistent  with  a  variety  of  interpretive  theories,  it  does  seem 
inconsistent  with  some  of  them.  For  example,  it  would  seem  to  cast  doubt  on  the  argument  that 
general  force  majeure  language  can  never  be  interpreted  as  reading  on  pandemic  risks,  since  a 
large  fraction  of  MAE  provisions  make  the  connection  explicitly.  But  it  also  casts  some  doubt  on 
the  opposite  proposition  that  general  language  always  captures  specific  pandemic  risks:  indeed, 
in  our  reading,  the  vast  majority  of  provisions  with  general  language  tend  to  enumerate  a  variety 
of  different  specific  contingencies  (such  as  weather,  climate  change,  terrorism,  and  the  like), 
perhaps  making  it  telling  that  the  pandemic  language  is  not  included  as  an  enumerated  example. 
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Although  it  is  easy  to  get  caught  up  in  the  quantitative  structure  of  MAE  provisions  to  the 
exclusion  of  other  considerations,  it  is  important  not  to  lose  sight  of  the  broader  institutional 
setting  that  frames  these  disputes.  Some  relevant  considerations  include  the  following: 
 
- Judicial  Reticence.  By  any  account,  common-law  courts  aren’t  pushovers  when  it  comes 
to  nullifying  contractual  obligations.  Contract  law  has  long  resisted  the  temptation  to 
rescue  a  regretful  party  once  foundational  risk  allocation  decisions  seem  locked  in.  This 
canonical  attribute  of  contract  law  carries  over  to  M&A,  too:  for  at  least  two  decades, 
Delaware  courts  have  consistently  held  that  buyers  wishing  to  bail  out  of  a  deal  “ought  to 
have  to  make  a  strong  showing  to  invoke  a  Material  Adverse  Effect” . 
 
- Burdens  of  Proof .   Consistent  with  the  foregoing  view,  MAEs  are  generally  interpreted  by 
courts  to  constitute  conditions  subsequent  to  the  obligation  to  close  (rather  than  as 
conditions  precedent ,  as  many  often  mis-label  them).  The  key  upshot  of  this  designation 
is  that  the  initial  burden  of  proof  to  invoke  an  MAE  rests  squarely  on  the  shoulders  of  the 
party  alleging  excuse  (almost  always  the  buyer).  And  if  the  underlying  evidentiary  case  is 
unclear,  or  if  competing  arguments  produce  an  approximate  stalemate  on  the  merits,  then 
the  case  is  resolved  in  favor  of  the  party  seeking  enforcement  of  the  contract  (usually  the 
seller).  
 
- Durational  Significance .  One  of  the  few  consistent  lodestars  in  existing  MAE 
jurisprudence  is  that  the  target’s  unanticipated  hardship  must  be  durationally  significant , 
and  not  merely  a  hiccup  in  revenues  or  earnings  over  a  quarter  or  two.  But  the  economic 
dislocation  caused  by  COVID-19  is  so  fresh  and  unfamiliar  that  reliable  forecasts  of 
long-term  implications  are  largely  impossible.  (The  historic  and  careening  volatility  in 
the  financial  markets  of  late  ably  attests  to  this  fact.)  And  thus,  as  of  this  writing  at  least, 
many  buyers  are  likely  to  find  themselves  unable  to  scare  up  the  evidence  needed  to  carry 
their  burden  of  proving  a  durationally  significant  adverse  effect  in  the  post-COVID 
world.  (Though  tourism-intensive  industries  may  have  the  best  shot).  
 
- Precedential  Tea  Leaves.  Finally,  as  we  noted  in  our  prior  post,  the  time  span  of  our 
original  data  set  also  coincided  with  an  era  in  which  no  Delaware  opinion  had  ever  found 
an  MAE  to  have  been  triggered .  Like  many  other  hot  streaks ,  however,  this  one 
eventually  came  to  an  end  in  the  fall  of  2018,  with  the  Chancery  Court’s  Akorn  v. 
Fresenius  opinion.  The  precedent  has  no  doubt  bolstered  the  confidence  of  rueful  buyers 
in  pending  deals  who  are  now  contemplating  invoking  their  MAEs.  (And  we  note  in 
passing  that  the  MAE  in  Akorn  specifically  carved  out  pandemics,  subjecting  the 
exclusion  to  a  “disproportionate  effects”  carve-in.)  Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to 
understand  that  while  Akorn  no  doubt  sent  a  message  that  the  “MAC  is  Back”  as  a 
front-line  issue  for  M&A  doctrine,  the  underlying  facts  of  the  case  diverge  considerably 
from  current  circumstances  (involving  highly  target-specific  issues  pertaining  to 
regulatory  clearance  and  outright  regulatory  fraud). 
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In  the  light  of  above  points,  we  conjecture  that  the  average  M&A  buyer  will  face  a  heavy  slog  in 
asserting  that  COVID-19  represents  a  deal-killing  force  majeure ,  even  when  the  MAE  contains 
no  carve  outs  for  pandemics  (general  or  specific).  The  odds  grow  longer  still,  of  course,  in  the 
presence  of  such  carve-outs. 
 
So  this  must  imply  that  savvy  acquirors  need  to  abandon  all  plans  to  declare  an  MAE,  right?  Not 
so  fast:  notwithstanding  the  uphill  battle  (and  long  odds)  faced  by  buyers  asserting  MAEs,  we 
can  think  of  several  reasons  why  rational  and  sophisticated  parties  might  still  pursue  this 
strategy: 
 
● First,  pressing  the  MAE  issue  can  buy  precious  time  for  the  acquirer.  Although  MAE 
litigation  moves  substantially  faster  in  Delaware  Chancery  Court  than  does  commercial 
litigation  in  other  venues,  the  process  is  still  far  from  instantaneous.  Moreover,  the 
temporary  closure  of  courthouses  in  Delaware  and  potential  delays  in  litigation  schedules 
due  to  the  outbreak  may  well  lead  to  unusually  protracted  timelines.  That,  in  turn,  could 
afford  buyers  an  opportunity  to  amass  additional  evidence  about  the  durational 
significance  of  the  COVID-19  crisis  (while  preserving  the  option  to  abandon  the  strategy 
down  the  road).  
 
● Second,  even  if  the  current  saga  proves  to  be  short-lived,  it  is  already  raising  fears  of  a 
medium-term  liquidity  crunch .  The  potential  delaying  effect  of  an  MAE  kerfuffle  can 
also  be  a  hidden  source  of  liquidity  for  cash  buyers,  at  least  until  the  current  market 
tumult  resolves  and  greater  sense  of  order  returns  to  capital  markets. 
 
● Finally,  invoking  the  MAE  may  be  part  of  a  larger  portfolio  of  strategies  that  buyers 
might  deploy  in  attempting  to  walk  from  −  or  potentially  restructure  −  a  signed  deal. 
Several  other  strategies  suggest  themselves  too,  including  asserting  the  failure  of  other 
closing  conditions  (related  to,  inter  alia ,  financing,  regulatory  clearance,  solvency,  and 
tax  status).  Moreover,  in  many  deals  acquirors  could  conceivably  threaten  a  backup 
strategy  of  using  a  “reverse  termination  fee”  (“RTF”)  to  permit  them  to  exit  a  deal  in 
exchange  for  paying  what  amounts  to  liquidated  damages  to  break  away.  The  figures 
below  plot  the  prevalence  of  reverse  termination  fees  as  a  function  of  each  type  of  MAE 
carve-out,  concentrating  on  both  all  deals  in  our  data  set  (left  panel)  and  pending  deals 
(right  panel).  As  illustrated  in  the  figures,  RTFs  appear  to  be  most  common  in  deals 
where  there  are  both  general  and  specific  carve-outs  −  i.e. ,  those  deals  that  would  (all  else 
held  constant)  be  least  amenable  to  granting  force  majeure  walking  rights.  Moreover,  the 
deals  that  have  neither  general  nor  specific  carve-outs  for  pandemic  risks  tend  on  the 
whole  to  be  more  likely  to  offer  RTFs  to  compensate. 
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A.  Prevalence  of  RTFs  by  Carve-Out  Type 
(2003-Pres) 
B.  Prevalence  of  RTFs  by  Carve-Out  Type 
(Pending  Deals;  3/2020) 
 
For  the  deals  that  include  RTFs,  one  can  drill  further  to  assess  the  relative  size  of  the  RTF 
(as  a  percentage  of  the  transaction  value)  by  carve-out  type.  As  the  figures  below 
demonstrate,  RTFs  tend  to  be  the  lowest  when  there  is  neither  a  general  nor  a  specific 
carve  out.  Recall  that  this  same  group  as  a  whole  was  relatively  less  likely  to  have  an 
RTF  to  begin  with.  On  the  whole,  then,  RTFs  and  MAEs  tend  to  operate  as  weak 
substitutes  for  one  another;  but  there  is  still  ample  room  for  many  buyers  to  use  them 
together  as  part  of  a  multi-pronged  approach  to  busting  up  a  deal  (or,  more  likely,  to  get  it 
restructured). 
  
A.  Size  of  RTF  by  Carve-Out  Type 
(2003-Pres.) 
B.  Size  of  RTF  by  Carve-Out  Type 
(Pending  Deals,  3/2020) 
 
We  close  by  reminding  readers  of  two  additional  points.  First,  M&A  is  but  one  domain  where 
force  majeure  provisions  are  ubiquitous).  One  can  also  find  them  in  financing  contracts,  supply 
contracts,  consumer  contracts,  employment  contracts  and  many  others.  In  these  other  settings, 
another  factor  may  play  a  critical  role  as  well:  the  presence  of  a  long-term  relationship,  in  which 
both  parties  may  interact  over  the  course  of  months,  years,  or  even  decades.  In  such  contexts, 
non-legal  considerations  may  be  as  important  (if  not  more  so)  than  legal  ones.  Thus,  even  if  a 
party  believes  that  it  may  have  the  legal  ability  to  walk  away  from  a  deal  on  the  basis  of  an 
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MAE,  doing  so  may  sabotage  a  long-term  business  relationship  that  is  far  more  valuable  in  the 
long  run. 
 
Second,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  this  area  of  law  remains  −  much  like  force  majeure 
terms  themselves  −  relatively  opaque  and  open  to  competing  arguments.  We  doubt  that  this  core 
feature  (or  is  it  a  bug?)  will  resolve  itself  any  time  soon.  In  the  meantime,  much  may  be  left  up  to 
courts  and  lawyers  to  work  out,  if  (as  we  expect)  buyers  begin  to  assert  walking  rights  on  the 
basis  of  a  less-than-clear  MAE.  And  that  observation  brings  us  to  a  final  prediction,  which  our 
analysis  permits  us  to  state  with  some  degree  of  confidence:  If  you  are  an  M&A  litigators  on 
either  side  of  the  courtroom  aisle  (and  you  remain  healthy  over  the  next  few  months),  your 
timing  couldn’t  be  better. 
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